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Abstract: This article deals with the Bulgarian denial of the Macedonian minority in Bulgaria, 
which is a key moment in the Bulgarian veto against Macedonia’s EU integration. The Bulgarian 
position that the Macedonian minority in Bulgaria does not exist directly contradicts the fact that 
this minority was previously officially recognized in Bulgaria and that in almost all censuses in 
the last 80 years thousands of Bulgarian citizens identified themselves as Macedonians. Refusing 
to face the reality and contrary to the recommendations of various international organizations 
and institutions in the last 20 years, the Bulgarian government refuses to start a dialogue with 
the minority and ascribes the actions of the Bulgarian citizens with Macedonian self-awareness 
to the R. Macedonia. However, initiatives in the international organizations and institutions in 
support of the Macedonian minority are not initiated by the Republic of Macedonia, but, quite 
the opposite, by Bulgarian citizens and organizations; such forums include not only the Council 
of Europe’s system in Strasbourg and the UN, but also the institutions of the European Union, 
where in fact Macedonia is not a member. Formulated back in 1963, the policy of denial of the 
Macedonian minority was the first in a series of “revival processes” aimed at assimilating mi-
norities into a “unified Bulgarian socialist nation”, but at the same time it is the last process to 
remain not condemned in Bulgaria and that continues to be implemented even today. During the 
communist era, this policy resulted in the deportation of a few thousand people to prisons, camps, 
or internments, as well as in the implementation of many other forms of repression. After the 
fall of communism, it resulted in exactly 14 judgments against Bulgaria ruled by the Strasbourg 
based European Court of Human Rights. The policy of the Bulgarian state today, which in essence 
follows the line created by the late dictator Todor Zhivkov, is the last totalitarian communist 
policy in the European Union.
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Introduction
After the signing of the Joint Declaration between Macedonia and Bulgaria on 22 February 
1999, Sofia expressed its unconditional support for Macedonia’s European integration. The 
same was done by the Macedonian side and the Republic of Bulgaria started its negotiations for 
1 Contact address: ratevski@gmail.com
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European membership in 2000, without Macedonia raising the issue of discrimination against 
the Macedonian minority in Bulgaria. Two weeks after Bulgaria received a date for the start of 
negotiations, on 29 February 2000, its Constitutional Court banned the only Macedonian party 
in Bulgaria (OMO “Ilinden” - PIRIN), registered only a year before (in the same month in which 
Bulgaria submitted its application for a date for the start of negotiations). Despite its constitutional 
obligation to care for the status and rights of persons belonging to the Macedonian people in 
neighbouring countries, and despite the continuous discrimination against the members of the 
Macedonian minority in Bulgaria and their organizations - which in 2001-2006 resulted with the 
first five judgments ruled by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR ) in Strasbourg where 
multiple violations of Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights were attributed 
to the Bulgarian authorities - the Republic of Macedonia chose not to react, thus Republic of 
Bulgaria grasped the opportunity to successfully start and complete the European integration 
process. Understandable in this period, Sofia did not make any provocations and promised full 
support for Macedonia’s future European integration. That changed in June 2006 when it became 
de facto clear that the Republic of Bulgaria would become a EU member-state as of 1 January 
2007. The concrete occasion for the change of its position was the attempt of 5700 Bulgarian 
citizens to re-register OMO “Ilinden”-PIRIN after ECtHR previously condemning deregistration 
of the party (Decision № 59489/00 of 20/10/2005, final on 20/01/2006). The legitimate and 
democratic attempt of the citizens of the Republic of Bulgaria to (re)establish their own party in 
Bulgaria was interpreted by the Bulgarian government as a provocation incited by the Republic 
of Macedonia. Bulgarian support turned to be “conditioned” by a prior fulfilment of several pre-
requisites, such as one stipulating “principles of good neighbourliness”, which Bulgaria understood 
as “the absence of aggression towards the Bulgarian nation and history by the Macedonian authorities” 
(Makedonia, 2006; Macedonism, 2006). This line has escalated to be realized in recent years in 
serial key documents.
In the Treaty of Friendship between the Republic of Bulgaria and the Republic of Macedonia 
from 1 August 2017, in Article p. 11.5 at the insistence of the Bulgarian side, a very rare for the 
international diplomatic practice asymmetric one-sided obligation (Kirilova, 2020) was inserted: 
“The Republic of Macedonia hereby confirms that nothing in its Constitution may be and should be 
interpreted in a way that it constitutes or shall ever constitute the basis for interference in the internal 
affairs of the Republic of Bulgaria, with the purpose of protecting the status and rights of persons, who 
are not nationals of the Republic of Macedonia” (Treaty, 2017). This text is directed against the 
Macedonian minority in Bulgaria, as it will be repeatedly expressed by the Bulgarian side in the 
coming years.2
In its Framework position regarding the enlargement of the EU in relation to Macedonia and 
Albania from 09.10.2019, the Bulgarian government directly stated that: “The Republic of Northern 
Macedonia should suspend and refrain from pursuing a policy, in whatever form, of supporting and 
2 For example, this is directly stated in the Clarification Memorandum that Bulgaria submitted to the EU members: 
”The Treaty also confirmed that any claims to the existence of the so-called ‘Macedonian minority’ on the territory of Bulgaria 
were unfounded“ (Memorandum 2020, also: Framework position, 2019).
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promoting claims for recognition of the so-called ‘Macedonian minority’ in Bulgaria.” (Framework 
position 2019). It was supported by the parliament with a special declaration on the same day 
(Declaration, 2019)
In Bulgarian Clarification Memorandum to the EU members from September 2020, a large 
part contains the request to the Republic of Macedonia to accept that the Macedonian minority 
in Bulgaria does not exist and to not support in any way the actions of the Bulgarian citizens 
with Macedonian self-awareness. It contains a whole section entitled “Minority Claims”, in which 
Bulgaria states that with Article 11 of the Treaty for friendship Macedonia “agreed that there 
are no objective historical or demographic grounds for seeking minority status for any group 
of citizens in Bulgaria”. There the very idea that there is a Macedonian minority in Bulgaria is 
considered as hate speech, hostile propaganda and the creation of stereotypes: “Official textbooks 
on history and geography, literature, visual arts, as well as some media, have also been used to reinforce 
these claims and to create antagonism with Bulgaria by spreading stereotypes… These manifestations 
of state-funded anti-Bulgarian ideology and practice contradict European values and should not be 
legitimized by joining the EU” (Memorandum, 2020).
From Bulgarian perspective, not only p. 5 in Art. 11 of the Treaty, but also the other parts of 
Article 11 are directly or indirectly aiming at preventing any kind of support of the Macedonian 
minority and its organizations: not encouraging or supporting “actions directed against the other 
country, which have a hostile character” (1), not allowing their territories to be used by organi-
zations and groups with separatist goals and other hostile activities (2); no territorial claims 
(3) can only protect the rights of its citizens on the territory of the other country (4); will take 
measures to prevent malicious propaganda by institutions and “will discourage the activities of 
private entities, aimed at inciting violence, hatred or other similar actions, which would harm their 
relations” (Treaty, 2017).
In all these demands, in one way or another, the Bulgarian positions towards the Macedonian 
minority are represented: this is a non-existent minority, the activities of its members are incited 
and supported from other states, and they have anti-Bulgarian, hostile and separatist character 
(regardless of the fact that the authorities never managed to offer any evidence in support of 
any of these claims).3
Regardless of the fact that on 18 November 2020, Macedonian Prime Minister Zoran Zaev 
declared that Macedonia has no minority and territorial claims against Bulgaria (Zaev, 2020), 
Bulgaria still blocked Macedonia EU candidacy in December 2020.
Bulgaria and its problems with the Macedonian minority
These positions of Bulgaria directly contradict two indisputable facts:
3 Compare the comment in the Advisory Committee's latest report: ”the authorities have not informed the Advisory 
Committee of any action of the above-mentioned associations or their members during the monitoring period which might 
have compromised the territorial integrity or unity of the Bulgarian state“ (Advisory 2020 & 99).
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1. The Macedonian minority in the period 1946 - 1963 was officially recognized in Bulgaria 
and enjoyed certain cultural rights such as the study of the Macedonian language and 
history (1947/8) or of the History of the Macedonian revolutionary movement (until 
1964), certain opportunities for the development of folklore and the like (Frusetta, 
2006, pp. 296 - 302).
2. n all censuses in the Republic of Bulgaria in the last 80 years, thousands of citizens 
in Bulgaria identified themselves as Macedonians.
At the time when the Macedonian minority was recognized, a high number of Macedonians 
were registered in the censuses, especially in the Blagoevgrad Province, historically known as 
Pirin Macedonia. Thus, on the school census for the academic year 1946/1947 out of a total 
of 43,920 students in the field, 35,184 (77.51%) identified themselves as Macedonians, 4538 
(10.33%) as Macedonian Muslims, 3184 (7.25%) as Bulgarians, and 1014 (2.31) % as Roma, Turks, 
Jews, etc. (Jotevski, 1996, pp. 109 -111). In the 1946 state census, 169,544 people in Bulgaria 
identified themselves as Macedonians, mainly in Pirin Macedonia. Especially important is the 
1956 census, organised with special measures to ensure free self-determination of Macedonians 
in Pirin Macedonia (Stojkov, 2015/2016, p. 73 n. 31). There 178 000 people declared themselves 
as Macedonians in Pirin Macedonia, where they occur as 63.33% of the population (versus 33% 
Bulgarians), and 187 787 in whole Bulgaria (Kanev, 1998, p. 97),
After the change of policy towards the Macedonian minority in 1963, during 1964 - 1965 mass 
agitation was undertaken to change the ethnicity of the population during the issuance of the 
new ID cards and the authorities managed to register 85% of the population in Pirin Macedonia 
as Bulgarians, but despite all measures, 30 000 (11%) still managed to register as Macedonians 
(Marinov, 2013, p. 154). The 1965 census organized after a big campaign of intimidation and us-
ing manipulation (“one manoeuvre” according to the dictator T. Zhivkov - Marinov, 2013, p. 154) 
reduced the numbers of Macedonians in Pirin Macedonia to 1 437 or 0.4% of the population (in 
accordance with the communist practice to leave up to 1% “others” to demonstrate “freedom”); 
however, in the interior of Bulgaria where manipulation was more difficult to carry out due to 
the scattering of Macedonians, they kept the former number of 8 230 (Jotevski, 1996, p. 154; 
Marinov, 2013, 156 ). At the 1975 census “citizens of non-Bulgarian origin” including Macedonians 
were observed, but the results were never published (Marinov, 2013, p. 155). In all censuses be-
tween 1963 – 1989, intimidations, tortures and manipulations were used to reduce the number 
of Macedonians (see below for repressions).
The results of the censuses after the fall of communism show respectively - 10 803 (1992), 5 
071 (2001) and 1608 (2011) Macedonians. During those censuses, campaigns were conducted to 
intimidate Macedonians through the media and public investigations against Macedonian activ-
ists were launched. In connection with the 2010 pilot census, 5 senior officials at the National 
Statistical Institute were fired for allowing a column with “non-existent ethnicities” (an option 
appeared on the electronic census under the column of “others” to check “Macedonians”) The 
results of the 2011 census regarding minorities were rejected by the Statistical Institute itself 
as inaccurate due to the existence of about 730 000 people without indicated ethnicity on the 
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census, mainly from minorities (Doklad, 2011; Advisory 2020). Despite the results, ”Macedonians 
are not mentioned in the overview published by the National Council for Co-operation on Ethnic and 
Integration Issues but figures on persons identifying as Macedonians were published in the 1992, 2001 
and 2011 census results” (Advisory 2020, & 23).
The Bulgarian politics of denial of the very existence of the Macedonian minority was formulated 
in the secret plenum of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communistic party in March 1963, 
in which Todor Zhivkov delivered a special speech, in which he stated, among other things, that: 
“The population of the Pirin region is part of the Bulgarian nation. There is no Macedonian ethnicity 
there and there cannot be ... that population can in no way be considered part of the Macedonian nation, 
which is being formed now in Vardar Macedonia and non in the least it can be said to ever join that 
nation … It is necessary to actively, continuously strengthen the Bulgarian ethnic consciousness in that 
population” (BKP, 1999, p. 1288, 1292, 1203).
As a consequence, the Macedonian minority in Bulgaria became an object of active repres-
sions and prosecutions. Many measures were taken for assimilation and change of the ethnicity 
of Macedonians, which led to mass persecution and sending hundreds of people to prisons, 
in internment, even more lost school or work, or were prosecuted in other ways. The policy of 
creating a homogenous Bulgarian socialist nation started with the denial and assimilation of 
Macedonians - the first “revival process” and the only one that was never condemned in Bulgaria, 
has given a large number of victims, a small percentage of which is documented (Gruev, 2011; 
Stoykov, 2013) but even this small percentage in the period 1956 - 1975 alone refers to over 85 
people, who are estimated to be only about 30% of the sentenced to jail for their Macedonian 
views in these years (Stoykov, 2020, 205 - 255).
In the period 1973 – 1983, between 23 - 47% of the capacity of The third department of the 6th 
Directorate of Security Services (specialized in the fight against minority nationalism) was allocated 
to fight the Macedonian minority (“pro-Macedonian nationalism”), even competing with the efforts 
against the far larger Turkish minority (Stojkov, 2020, p. 237, 238).
Bulgaria has not changed its policy towards the Macedonian minority after the fall of Com-
munism in 1989, with the exception that Macedonians are not sent to prison for expressing 
their ethnicity. Until 2007 all peaceful gatherings of Macedonians were forbidden and dispersed, 
and to this day attempts of registration of their own NGO’s are prevented leading to 14 verdicts 
against Bulgaria in Strasburg. 4
4 European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) Boris Stankov and United Macedonian Organisation "Ilinden" v. Bulgaria 
no. 59491/00. Judgment of 19 January 2001; ECtHR, United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden - Pirin and others, no 
59489/00 Judgment of 20/10/2005, final on 20/01/2006; ECtHR, Ivanov and Others v. Bulgaria, no. 46336/99, 24 
November 2005; ECtHR, United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden and others, 59491/00, Judgment of 19/01/2006, 
final on 19/04/2006; ECtHR, United Macedonian Organisation "Ilinden" and others v. Bulgaria no. 34960/04. Judgment 
of 18 October 2011; ECtHR, United Macedonian Organisation "Ilinden" and Ivanov v. Bulgaria no. 37586/04. Judgment 
of 18 October 2011; ECtHR, Singartiyski and Others v. Bulgaria no. 48284/07. Judgment of 18 October 2011; ECtHR, 
United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden – PIRIN and Others v. Bulgaria. No. 2 nos. 41561/07 and 20972/08 Judgment of 18 
October 2011; Kiril Ivanov v. Bulgaria (Application no. 17599/07); Yordan Ivanov and Others v. Bulgaria (Application no. 
70502/13); United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden and Others v. Bulgaria (No. 3), (Application no. 29496/160); Vasilev 
and Society of the Repressed Macedonians in Bulgaria Victims of the Communist Terror v. Bulgaria, Judgment of 28 May 
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Immediately after the fall of Communism - on 6 March 1990, this political line against the 
minority was reinforced by the Bulgarian Parliament in respond to Yugoslavia’s request for 
recognition of the Macedonian minority with a declaration describing the request as an attempt 
to interfere in Bulgaria’s internal affairs and “distort our national history” and declaring that 
“there is no historical or legal, nor any other grounds for seeking such a minority”, and called it “a 
non-existent minority” (Rabotnichesko delo, 1990, p. 1). It has remained the permanent position 
of the Bulgarian government so far. On 29 February 2000 it becomes part of the decision of the 
Constitutional Court of the Republic of Bulgaria: “In the Republic of Bulgaria there is no separate 
Macedonian ethnos” (Hadzistoychev, 2000). This statement will become the basis of a series of 
court decisions rejecting the requests of Macedonians in Bulgaria to register their organizations 
(See for example: Uzunova, 2014a; Uzunova, 2014b; Petkov, 2015a; Petkov, 2015b; Tsolova, 2019; 
Uzunova, 2020; Dimitrov, 2020; Ivanov, 2020, 2; Nicolova, 2020, 2), or serve as an argument for 
revoking the registrations of such (Gulubova, 2019). In these court decisions the very claim that 
there is such a minority is treated as an anti-state, anti-constitutional activity directed against 
the unity of the nation, the territorial integrity of the country, and even the rights of the majority 
of citizens. As an illustration, I will cite the argumentation in three such court decisions:
“In the Republic of Bulgaria there is no formed Macedonian ethnos and part of the indicated in 
the Association statute claim that such ethnos exists, as a minority, without rights and are call-
ing for its endurance and protection of the Macedonian cause, because of which they represent 
actions against the unity of the Bulgarian nation and its territorial integrity including as a basic 
constitutional principle in the sense of article 44, 2 of the Constitution” (Ivanov, 2009).
“The registration is inadmissible … because the activity of the registrant structure will affect the 
unity of the Bulgarian nation. … the means to achieve its goals … The way they are formulated, the 
sense in which they are used, and the invested content reveals their political character imposing 
the ignoring of the Bulgarian character of certain geographic regions. So… activities are foreseen, 
connected to the Macedonian past and heritage, organizing lectures, speeches and reports about 
past and present problems of the Macedonian people, they proclaim collection, publishing and 
conservation of memoirs and other materials related to the “repressed Macedonians in Bulgaria” 
and also providing juridical and other assistance of activities of the “repressed Macedonians.” … 
All these lead to the conclusion that it is a claim for the registration of an association the goals 
and name of which are against the law. It cannot be admitted that it is the case of a structure 
with goals to protect the historical traditions and cultural wealth of a certain community. …
The realisation of the essential goals undoubtedly will negatively reflect on the unity of the Bul-
garian nation and its sovereignty.” (Blagoevgrad, 2010).
“The Constitutional norm of art. 44, par. 2, prohibits organizations whose activities are directed 
against the sovereignty, the territorial integrity of the country and the unity of the nation, towards 
encouraging racial, national, ethnic and religious hatred, towards the violation of the rights and 
freedoms of the citizens. As such follows to be qualified also the organization for the protection 
of the interests of an ethnic minority which is not historically structured and formed on the ter-
ritory of the Republic of Bulgaria... The systematic interpretation of such formulated goals in the 
2020 (Application no. 23702/15); Macedonian Club for Ethnic Tolerance in Bulgaria and Radonov v. Bulgaria, Judgment of 
28 May 2020 (Application no. 67197/13)
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statute and the means for their achievement indicates that it contains claims for the existence 
of a Macedonian ethnic minority whose rights are violated and are subject to protection by the 
association. There is no Macedonian ethnic minority in the Republic of Bulgaria … That is why 
the designation of such minority through non-profit organization-association, made to function 
to satisfy their specific needs, in reality it does not protect their rights, if they are no different 
from those of the other citizens but cultivate a different ethnic identity among a certain part of 
the Bulgarian citizens, identity which was not formed in a natural historical way and therefore 
is aimed against the unity of the nation, which is not allowed according to art. 44, par. 2 of the 
Constitution.” (Bozhkova, 2013).
Some verdicts include humiliating statements that the goals such as promotion of Macedonian 
folklore and history or defending the rights of Macedonian minority “are not in keeping with the 
norms established by Article 38 of ZYULNTS” (Maseva, 2018, pp 2-3. Decision, 2018) i.e., they are 
not in the scope of generally humane, humanitarian, cultural and socially useful goals.
The denial of the very existence of the Macedonian minority is the main basis for the rejections 
for registration of Macedonian NGOs, even though courts often use euphemisms to express this 
(Кanev, 2016, & 16; Kanev, 2017, p. 2). In the courts, Macedonians are registered in documents 
as Bulgarians even when they clearly state that they are Macedonians, and some judges argue 
with them that there is no such thing as Macedonians.5
As a result, registered Macedonian organizations are short-living exceptions, and in reality, 
Macedonians are isolated form political and social life. Not one of the registered parties in Bulgaria 
defends the rights of Macedonians in Bulgaria. The two Macedonian parties in Bulgaria - OMO 
“Ilinden” - PIRIN (1997 - 2021) and OMO PIRIN (2002 - 2005) have received 4 rejections, and in 
the meantime the conditions for registration were raised 100 times: from 50 members in 1998 to 
5000 members in 2005 (the number 5000 coincided with the number of registered Macedonians 
at the 2001 census - 5071), to be reduced in 2008 to 2500. The only registered party of Macedo-
nians existed for one year. There were dozens of rejected attempts for registrations of Macedonian 
NGOs in the last 30 years. Only two were registered in 2019 under strong international pressure, 
one of which was banned the following year and the other is in the process of being revoked.
Macedonian minority issue in the Bulgarian–Macedonian relations
The R. Macedonia, contrary to Bulgarian complaints, has not formally raised the issue of the 
Macedonian minority with Bulgarian governments in the last 30 years; it has not taken any official 
international initiatives in that direction, nor has it appeared in the role of a representative and 
lawyer of Macedonian organizations in Bulgaria before the ECtHR (something Bulgaria regularly 
does for the organizations of the Bulgarian minority in the Republic of Macedonia). The initia-
tives or cases concerning the Macedonian minority in international institutions are not started 
by R. Macedonia, and even when some Macedonian representatives in such institutions have 
5 Filchev, 2018, p. 1, 2; Manoleva, 2019, p. 1; See” “Judge Filchev declared that there are no Macedonians, all that is an 
invention of the Comintern, what sort of Macedonian are you, are you crazy?” (Written explanation by Tilev, 2018b, p. 4, 
8; Tilev, 2018a, p. 2; Report, 2019)
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given support to some initiatives, it is not done constantly and clearly does not constitute any 
consistent policy of the Macedonian governments. However, the Republic of Bulgaria insists on 
obtaining guarantees that no Macedonian official representative in any international institution 
will ever support the appeals of the Macedonian minority: “The Republic of North Macedonia shall 
unreservedly and urgently bring its positions and actions in international organizations and formats 
into line with Article 11 of the Neighbourhood Treaty, clearly stating that there are no ... grounds to seek 
minority status for any group of citizens on the territory of the Republic of Bulgaria. The multilateral 
formats and monitoring mechanisms of the Council of Europe should not be instrumentalized by the 
Republic of North Macedonia to put pressure on Bulgaria on issues related to the rights of persons 
belonging to minority groups” (Framework Position, 2019).
The same statement could be found in the Memorandum: “In violation of Art. 11 of the Treaty, 
Skopje has not changed the policy of the former governments to encourage and support individuals and 
organizations seeking the recognition of a non-existent ‘Macedonian minority’ in Bulgaria... Bulgaria 
expects the Republic of North Macedonia to fulfil its commitments, to suspend the above policies, to 
bring its positions and actions in international organizations and forums in accordance with Art. 11 of 
the Treaty and to end its practice of instrumentalizing multilateral formats and monitoring mechanisms 
for exerting undue pressure on Bulgaria. This will be a prerequisite for obtaining Bulgaria’s consent for 
each next step in the integration process” (Memorandum, 2020).
The goal of the Bulgarian government, however, is not only to guarantee that the appeals 
of the Bulgarian citizens with Macedonian ethnic identity in the future will not receive support 
from the Republic of Macedonia as an EU member, but also as we saw in Art. 11 of the Treaty, to 
prevent any support on an individual level that citizens of the Republic of Macedonia could give 
to their co-ethnics in Bulgaria based on a sense of national solidarity.
Initiatives for the protection of the rights of the Macedonian minority are developed on the 
initiative and in the organization of Bulgarian citizens with Macedonian self-awareness, and 
with the support of international institutions and organizations, as well as some Bulgarian 
organizations such as the Bulgarian Helsinki Committee. The pressure on Bulgaria comes from 
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (CoE), the Committee of Ministers of the 
CoE, the CoE’s Commissioner for Human Rights, the European Commission against Racism and 
Intolerance (ECRI), the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities (FCNM), the independent human rights observers at the UN, The Rule of Law 
Monitoring Committee (DRFMG) in the European Parliament, the European Free Alliance and 
the European Parliament. All of them in their reports on Bulgaria in recent years have raised 
the issue of the rights of the Macedonian minority members. The Committee of Ministers (CoE) 
has placed Bulgaria under intensified monitoring since 2016 for not executing the judgments 
delivered in these Macedonian cases. With the last two ECtHR’s decisions from May 2020, the 
judgments against Bulgaria for violating the rights of Macedonians in Bulgaria became 14. In 
2020, a series of international institutions raised the issue of the Macedonian minority to the 




“Bulgaria should take decisive measures to execute the Court’s judgments concerning the right 
to freedom of association of persons aiming to advance the recognition of the Macedonian mi-
nority in Bulgaria and the promotion of Macedonian culture. The authorities are urged to allow 
persons identifying as ethnic Macedonians to register their associations and refrain from refusing 
registration on grounds related to the recognition or non-recognition of the Macedonian minority 
in Bulgaria ... to engage in a constructive dialogue with persons identifying themselves as ethnic 
Macedonians” (Report, 2020, & 49).
On 26 May 2020, the Advisory Committee on the FCNM adopted its 4th report for Bulgaria and 
concluded, “the authorities have not entered into a dialogue with persons identifying as Macedonians, 
who continue to request recognition as a national minority and protection under the Framework Con-
vention” (Advisory, 2020, & 13). DRFMG on 28 August 2020, in its 23rd question to the Bulgarian 
Minister of Justice and the Commission against Discrimination, asked what measures would be 
taken in relation to, among other things, “attempts to hinder the work of e.g., NGOs working with 
the Macedonian-Bulgarian minority (deregistering and NGO)” (DRFMG, 2020). On October 1, the 
CoE’s Committee of Ministers in its resolution directly asked Bulgaria to stop discriminating 
organizations fighting for the recognition of the Macedonian minority in Bulgaria (Resolution 
CM, 2020). On 2 October 2020, The European Parliament adopted a resolution on Bulgaria in 
which it demanded from the Bulgarian Government: “to take all necessary measures to safeguard 
the rights of minorities effectively, in particular the rights to freedom of expression and freedom of 
association, including through the implementation of the relevant judgments of the European Court of 
Human Rights” and in footnote cited the ECtHR judgments for Macedonian NGO OMO “Ilinden” 
(EP Resolution, 2020, 15, n. 3).
As we can see, these are not only institutions in the framework of the Council of Europe in 
Strasburg or UN, but also of the European Union where R. Macedonia is not a member. The 
reactions in Bulgaria to this pressure are extremely negative.
The accusations against the Republic of Macedonia are therefore on one hand baseless – 
because even if R. Macedonia really implemented the politics of supporting the Macedonian 
minority in Strasbourg – it is not something negative or in any way directed against Bulgaria; 
on the other hand, it is simply not true. Bulgarian positions on this matter are not based on real 
facts, but on the ideological need to explain the existence of people with Macedonian self-aware-
ness in Bulgaria and their actions without recognizing the minority. If such minority does not 
exist, it means that someone from outside is creating problems. “The problem with the creation 
of a Macedonian minority started from outside ... This is not a process initiated by internal forces in 
Bulgaria” (Prodanov, 2020) and accordingly the “provoked from outside demands for minority are 
unacceptable” (Memorandum, 2020). Bulgaria categorically refuses to accept the reality that the 
activities are on the one hand - the work of its own citizens, and on the other hand that they are 
not directed against the state, nor against its institutions and integrity6 but only in the direction 
of the affirmation of minority rights under international law.
6 The striving of the Macedonian minority organizations towards registration is by itself a clear sign that they rec-
ognize the state laws and institutions and that they want to work within their framework.
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The roots of this anti-minority policy
All conditions raised by Bulgaria to the R. Macedonia about history, language and minority 
evolved together as part of the evolution of Bulgarian policy about the Macedonian minority. In 
the period 1946 - 1948, when Bulgaria was ready to exchange Pirin Macedonia for other territories 
in Yugoslavia and become a part of the future enlarged South Slavic federation, the Bulgarian 
authority and science were ready to recognize the existence of a Macedonian identity even in 
the Middle Ages (Angelov, 1947, 1 - 15; Jotevski, 1996, pp. 125, 126). After the eruption of the 
Stalin – Tito conflict in 1948, the Bulgarian government saw a chance to turn this policy around 
and to use Macedonian minority as a tool to expand its territory, by proclaiming a policy for the 
unification of Macedonia but within Bulgaria and Pirin Macedonia to serve as a Piedmont (Mari-
nov, 2013, p. 51). For the implementation of this policy a redefinition of the Macedonian nation 
and its history was made in the way to give arguments for this new line. According to the new 
official version, the Macedonians were part of Bulgarian people until 1878, and then gradually 
separated into a separate nation but still closest to Bulgarians, and learning the Macedonian 
language was stopped as “not wanted” by the population that already used Bulgarian language 
in the past. At the same time, Sofia had to deflect Yugoslavia’s and Macedonia’s aspirations for 
Pirin Macedonia, supported by the self-determination of the majority of the population there 
according to the censuses results, where Macedonians appeared closely to 2/3 of the total popu-
lation in the province. To counter this, Sofia post-factum declared the results of the 1946 census 
as exaggerated and not proper expression of self-determination of the population. According to 
the new official line, there were Macedonians in Bulgaria, but they were a minority even in Pirin 
Macedonia. This policy of ‘unified Macedonia within Bulgaria’ came to an end in 1956 with the 
normalisation of the relation between Moscow and Belgrade. Simultaneously, the census of 1956, 
when 63 % of the population in Pirin Macedonia self-determined itself again as Macedonians, 
left the Bulgarian state without arguments against renewed in 1957 Yugoslavian claims for the 
autonomy of Pirin Macedonia.
This led to a new change of the Bulgarian position with a simple goal to avoid the danger 
of losing territory, which in the period 1957 – 1963 evolved into the conclusion that the only 
permanent and safe solution was removing the self-awareness of the problematic minority. 
These led to a change in the interpretation of the Macedonian nation itself. The next version of 
history was accepted by the political leadership, namely, the same version of history that Bulgaria 
wants to impose on Macedonia today. The historiography and philology were mobilised (Stojkov, 
2015/2016, pp. 71 - 81) to prove that the Macedonian minority in Bulgaria could not exist because 
the Macedonian nation was formed only after 1944 and only in the Republic of Macedonia, and 
the history, culture and language of Macedonians were and are Bulgarian (Stojkov, 2020, pp. 
231 - 238). The only reason for the change of date of the “creation” of the Macedonian nation 
from 1878 to 1944 was to annul any possibility that the people in Pirin Macedonia were part 
of the process of the creation of the Macedonian nation. Even today, the so-called liberal wing 
in Bulgarian historiography does not deviate from this red line - the Macedonian nation could 
not have started to form before 1912, not because it is a fact or that there are no documents to 
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the contrary (there are many), but because if the beginning of the process was before dividing 
Macedonia, it also could mean that it included Pirin Macedonia.
The official position on censuses results also evolved. If in the period 1948 - 1956 it was claimed 
that they were only exaggerated, but still partially real, after 1956 they were completely denied 
and “explained” by alleged violence - and the whole process was labelled “violent Macedonianization” 
(for example: Angelov, 2004). To this date, no specific individual case of a person repressed for 
refusing to declare himself as a Macedonian has been documented, unlike the well-documented 
repression of members of the Macedonian minority. Against the results of the censuses after 
1956 when the thesis of “violent Macedonianization” is not an applicable explanation, the Bulgarian 
state adopted a position that even if there were some individuals who identify themselves as 
Macedonians, they were not objectively different from other Bulgarian citizens and therefore they 
do not constitute a national minority. Liberal Bulgarian scientists today also cannot cross this 
red line - to recognize that the thousands of people who identify themselves as Macedonians in 
the censuses constitute a minority, a collective; for them, they are individuals who do not con-
stitute a collectivity and cannot be viewed as a minority. In that, all the wings of the Bulgarian 
intelligentsia are in consensus - the Macedonian minority does not exist and cannot exist, and 
the Macedonian nation should be formed only inside the borders of Republic of Macedonia.
The reality that the historical dispute has as one of the key goals to create a narrative that 
excludes the possibility of the existence of the Macedonian minority in Bulgaria is very directly 
stated in the Explanatory Memorandum of the Bulgarian government:
“The process of identity building was limited only to the territory of the former Socialistic Republic 
of Macedonia, and after 1991 to the Republic of Macedonia. Although Bulgarian citizens did 
not take part in it, the authorities in the Republic of North Macedonia still claim that there is a 
‘Macedonian minority’ in Bulgaria…. However, Bulgaria cannot accept that the ongoing process 
of nation-building in the Republic of North Macedonia will be realised through… unsubstantiated 
allegations of the existence of a ‘Macedonian minority’ in Bulgaria” (Memorandum, 2020). “The 
Republic of North Macedonia ... (should) ... clearly declare that there are no historical and demo-
graphic grounds to seek minority status for any group of citizens on the territory of the Republic 
of Bulgaria” (Framework Position, 2019).7
Similarly, the issue of the Macedonian language is closely intertwined with the aspiration 
to deny any possibility of the existence of a Macedonian minority in Bulgaria. The Macedonian 
language was already taught in the schools in Pirin Macedonia in 1948 and was used on the 
Bulgarian national radio. The policy for its denial gradually escalated in parallel with the attempts 
to manage the “problem” with the Macedonian minority, started in 1948 with the criticism of the 
Macedonian literary language as being allegedly “artificial” and even “Serbianized”, but without 
7 The same ideologically driven motivation explains the great efforts that the Bulgarian state is making to artificially 
create Bulgarian minorities in Albania and Kosovo by granting Bulgarian citizenship and blackmailing the Albanian 
government on its path to European integration - the aim is to show that the Macedonian nation and identity exist 
in the middle of the “Bulgarian ethnic space” and that the process of the formation of the Macedonian nation does 
not extend beyond the Republic of Macedonia, despite the reality that there are Macedonian minorities in Greece, 
Albania, Kosovo and Bulgaria.
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offering an alternative, and then with the position that the Bulgarian language appears close and 
even native to the Macedonian minority in Bulgaria, to reach an open denial of the uniqueness 
of the Macedonian language in 1960s and insisting that it is part of the Bulgarian language and 
could not be more than a regional written norm of the Bulgarian language. For this purpose, a 
purge was made among Bulgarian scientists who recognized the Macedonian language, some 
like Professor Dina Stanisheva lost their jobs, and others, like a Bulgarian Academy of Science’s 
member Ivan Lekov, were retired prematurely. This position has been strictly maintained to this 
day.8 The language question is closely linked not only to the questioning of the Macedonian iden-
tity in general, but also to the denial of the Macedonian minority. If Macedonian was recognized 
by Bulgaria as a separate language, it would not only be viewed as a recognition of a separate 
ethnic basis of the Macedonian nation, but also as an objective criterion for the recognition of 
the Macedonian minority in Bulgaria, whose members would have the right to seek to study the 
language of their nation.9 Insisting that it is a Bulgarian dialect or a Bulgarian regional norm 
takes away such an “objective basis” for the existence or recognition of the Macedonian minority.
Thus, the three questions raised by Bulgaria to Macedonia - about language, history and the 
minority (the primary issue being the issue of the minority), are essentially three aspects of the 
same problem - an attempt to ideologically redefine reality to defend the Bulgarian national 
myth and take away any basis for the recognition of the Macedonian minority.10 The real goal of 
the Bulgarian policy is perfectly summarized in the statement on 31.10 2020 given to Reuters 
by the Bulgarian foreign minister:
“The Bulgarian pressures are related to the constant claims of the Republic of North Macedonia 
for the Macedonian minority in our country”, and as a way to avoid the Bulgarian veto, she 
“see the possibility of Skopje recognizing that their roots and language had a Bulgarian basis and 
thus to put an end to all claims that there is a clearly expressed ‘Macedonian’ minority. If North 
Macedonia agrees, Sofia is ready to recognize Macedonian as one of the official languages  of its 
neighbour, as well as Macedonian identity.” (Zaharieva, 2020).
Unable to convince Macedonians in Bulgaria to stop fighting for their rights, Bulgaria rejects 
the dialogue with them and prefers to negotiate for its own citizens with a foreign country.
The Bulgarian authorities understand the European integration of Macedonia and the possi-
bility of it being blocked by Sofia as the only and last chance to force Skopje to accept Bulgarian 
claims, something that has not succeeded so far, and there are no prospects of it to be achieved. 
The right for veto is turned into a simple blackmail. Created by a totalitarian regime, Bulgarian 
8 See: "the official language used in today's Republic of North Macedonia can only be considered as a written regional norm 
of the Bulgarian language" (Memorandum, 2020).
9 As Bulgarian government openly admitted about Macedonian language “Today, regional versions of the same language 
are still spoken on both sides of the border between Bulgaria and the Republic of North Macedonia.” (Memorandum, 2020)
10 Compare in Memorandum, 2020: “Reconsideration of our common history, denial of our common ethnic and linguistic 
roots or unfounded claims about the existence of a ‘Macedonian minority’ in Bulgaria ... unfounded minority, historical, linguistic 
and other claims”, those three are put together in every sentence.
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policies endanger not only the minority rights but equally the rights to free expressions and 
freedom of science, and European integration processes.
Bulgarian argumentation against the demands from its own citizens and international 
institutions
The Bulgarian policy aims to isolate the Macedonian minority from political and social life, 
and to cripple it capacity to defend its rights and cultivate, preserve, and transmit its culture 
and self-awareness, giving opportunity to the state policy of assimilation to finish its job. Many 
Bulgarian politicians and nationalists often express their hopes and believe that time is working 
in their favour and against the survival of the Macedonian minority.
Simultaneously, Bulgaria tends to block every foreign intervention in favour of the Macedonian 
minority, not only from R. Macedonia, but most importantly from international institutions. The 
outside pressure and external interference are viewed as serious danger that could hinder the 
policy of assimilation of the minority. International pressure is offset by three different levels 
of argumentation.
Firstly, the absence of a generally accepted and legally binding definition of a term “national 
minority” is interpreted by the Bulgarian authorities as a justification for refusing to define whether 
there are such minorities in Bulgaria. Even though the Framework Convention has been ratified 
in Bulgaria, it is still quite common for representatives of the Bulgarian government to declare 
that there are no minorities in Bulgaria, and especially not a Macedonian minority.11
Secondly, based on the fact that international law predominantly guarantees individual rather 
than collective rights, Bulgarian authorities oppose to prescribe strict minority rights, because 
“Bulgaria does not give collective, but only individual rights” (Memorandum, 2020). Minority rights, 
however, are individual rights, which can be exercised collectively - or “individually as well as in 
community with others”, as stated clearly in the Art. 3. par. 2 of the FCNM - in the very same 
manner as other human rights (right of the freedom of assembly, organization, marriage, etc. – 
Convention, 1995, Art. 5, para. 2).
Thirdly, by imposing a differentiation between objective and subjective criteria for the recog-
nition of a minority.
“The right to free individual self-identification is inextricably linked to the objective criteria related 
to the identity of the person. Therefore, on the basis of the Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria, 
this right can be exercised according to the cumulative fulfilment of both subjective (presence 
of free will to belong to a certain ethnic, religious, linguistic minority group or community) and 
objective criteria (existence of real differences that objectively prove the existence of ethnicity, 
religion, language, significantly different from those of the majority).” (Memorandum, 2020).
This kind of argumentation is intentionally used to declare the impossibility of the existence of 
a Macedonian minority (as “not different” from Bulgarians), and in essence constitutes an attempt 
11 For example, foreign minister N. Mladenov in May 2010: «There is no Macedonian minority in Bulgaria. There are no 
minorities in our country – there are certain ethnic groups only, and we respect their human and civil rights» (Ratevski, 2010)
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of the authorities to monopolise the right to decide whether or not to recognize the existence of 
a minority. This insistence is in contradiction with the international regulations, as it is directly 
stated in the report written by the UN’s Independent Expert on Minority Issues, following its 
thematic visit to Bulgaria:
“The question of the existence of minorities is addressed by the Human Rights Committee in its 
general comment No. 23 (1994) on the rights of minorities. Article 5.2 states that ’the existence 
of an ethnic, religious or linguistic minority in a given State party does not depend upon a decision 
by that State party but requires to be established by objective criteria’… the Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination has established in its general recommendation No. 8 (1990) 
on article 1 of the Convention that ‘such identification shall, if no justification exists to the con-
trary, be based upon self-identification by the individual concerned’” (Report, 2011, & 94, 95).
Much in the same line are the observations made by the Advisory Committee on the FCNM, 
stipulated in the 4th opinion on Bulgaria’s execution of the Convention’s articles in practice:
“the right to free self-identification contained in Article 3 of the Framework Convention is not only 
a central provision of the Framework Convention but, as the European Court of Human Rights 
has pointed out, “the ‘cornerstone’ of international law on the protection of minorities in general.” 
While it may be legitimate to link the recognition of a group as a national minority to objective 
criteria, these criteria must not be defined or construed in such a way as to limit arbitrarily the 
possibility of such recognition and the views of persons belonging to the group concerned should 
be taken into account by the authorities when conducting their own analysis as to the fulfilment 
of objective criteria. While member states have a margin of appreciation in determining how to 
approach the question of right-holders in compliance with national and international obligations, 
they shall seek solutions that are not arbitrary and prevent the unjustified exclusion of persons 
from protection under the Framework Convention. Furthermore, the Advisory Committee recalls 
that recognition by the state as a minority is not a prerequisite to qualify for the protection of 
the Framework Convention“ (Advisory 2020, &25).
Bulgarian position did not change: Bulgaria insists on the denial of the existence of a Macedo-
nian minority to be accepted as part of the conditions for good neighbourliness, and then for the 
right to determine whether or not Macedonia fulfils the conditions for good neighbourliness at 
each stage of Euro-integration, and urges member states to support it (Memorandum, 2020). In 
this, there no difference between the communistic dictator Todor Zhivkov, the today’s Bulgarian 
nationalists, or even the liberals - they all repeat the same infamous formula: “There was never a 
Macedonian minority in Bulgaria, there is not and there will/cannot be” (Dzambasky, 2020; Kunev, 2020).
The last totalitarian communist policy in the EU
While at the time the policy of denying the existence of the Macedonian minority emerged, it 
had a partial excuse in the fear of possible territorial losses; nonetheless, the methods through 
which it was implemented and its intermediate goals left it without legitimate basis, and one 
might rightfully define it as a totalitarian nationalist policy directed towards assimilation and 
repressions. It has led to many sufferings and problems for both ethnic Macedonians in Bulgaria 
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but also on the Balkans generally (Stoykov, 2013; Stojkov, 2020, pp. 205 - 255). As it is obvious, 
it continues to create many problems both in terms of the rights of some citizens of the Republic 
of Bulgaria, as well as in relations between Bulgaria and Macedonia. Today that policy is only an 
ideological relic of the totalitarian past - the last living totalitarian policy in the European Union. 
The main goal for its creation lost its significance long ago - today there is no danger of losing 
territories or harbouring separatist aspirations among the Macedonian minority. Namely, after 
some 60 years of persecution, discrimination and assimilation, persons with Macedonian ethnic 
identity in Bulgaria turned out to be a minority even in Pirin Macedonia, i.e., the region where 
the vast majority of population twice in a decade (1946-1956) declared themselves as ethnic 
Macedonians. The European integration process alone should make such fears also unfounded. 
However, the mechanisms and state structures created after the 1960s - by the communist elite, 
in what used to be a People’s Republic of Bulgaria – and tasked to enforce that kind of policy 
are still alive, and the ideology created by them even nowadays shapes the minds of the political 
and cultural elite in Sofia. The attempts to proceed unimpededly with the policy of the former 
communist dictator Todor Zhivkov by abusing the instruments of European integration cannot 
bring anything good.
However, it hints a very serious problems ahead - Macedonia cannot do anything for the 
Macedonian minority in Bulgaria to disappear, nor to order the Bulgarian citizens to act ‘prop-
erly’. However, Bulgaria, being trapped in the parallel universe created by its very ideology, will 
continue to interpret the actions of its own citizens with Macedonian self-consciousness as being 
purportedly inspired by Skopje - and thus as an allegedly hostile anti-Bulgarian activity of the 
Republic of Macedonia – which, in the end, will probably result in another blockade of Macedonia’s 
European integration path, and in such a way will endanger the European future of the Balkans.
Therefore, the future of the Republic of Macedonia becomes a hostage to an internal problem 
for Bulgaria, which Sofia is unable and unwilling to solve. The vicious circle between the struggles 
of the Macedonian minority in Bulgaria and the irrational nationalist ideology of Sofia, incapable 
to accept the reality, tends to be a never-ending story. In other words, Sofia continues to fight 
for its totalitarian dreams, whereas ethnic Macedonians (in Bulgaria and Macedonia alike) are 
put in the position of being ‘collective hostages’ to Bulgaria’s ‘nightmares’.
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